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The Left-For-Dead Fiction of Corporate "Presence": Is It
Revived by Burnham?
In Burnham v. Superior Court of California,' four members of the United
States Supreme Court argued that physical presence, without more, is a valid
basis for jurisdiction over individuals. In doing so, the Justices determined that
a "minimum contacts" analysis should not be applied, suggesting instead that
presence alone is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. The Court, however, was not
faced with the issue of whether personal jurisdiction over corporations based on
presence alone violates due process. Some post-Burnham cases have ruled in the
affirmative2 and others in the negative3 when confronted with this question.
It is essential to distinguish between individuals and corporations because the
intangible quality of corporations makes it much more difficult to determine
when and where a corporation is "present"; in contrast, individuals are present
wherever they may be found. Given this difference, this Note will discuss
whether the principle of Burnham, allowing jurisdiction over an individual based
on his mere presence and without regard for a subjective "fairness" analysis,"
may be extended to assert jurisdiction over a corporation based on its "presence."
The answer to this question is important because if "presence" of a
corporation is validated as a basis for jurisdiction, it may be that "presence" and
general jurisdiction are alternative bases for jurisdiction over nonresident
corporations. The result of using "presence" as an alternative basis for
jurisdiction could lead to many instances of unlimited jurisdiction over large
corporations in virtually every state. If, according to Burnham, corporate
presence is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, then large corporations that are
subject to service of process in many different states could be subject to a court's
jurisdiction-without more-in all of those states.
In marked contrast, a general jurisdiction framework requires a subjective
inquiry into the contacts of the corporation with the forum state. Only if the
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 495 U.S. 604, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992); MBM
Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop & Shipyard, Inc., 804 P.2d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991);
Demirs v. Plexicraft, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 250 (D.R.I. 1990).
3. See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Purex Indus., Inc., 576 A.2d 942 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1990); In
re DES, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
4. This so-called "fairness" analysis in personal jurisdiction law was endorsed by the Court
with the decision of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct, 154 (1945). In
deciding whether the assertion of jurisdiction over the individual is "fair," a court must determine
whether maintenance of the suit comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." Id. at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 158 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339.
343 (1940)). Four members of the Court in Burnham rejected the notion that this test should be used
for defendants present in the forum state and instead applied the "power" theory of jurisdiction,
which gives a state, based on its sovereignty, the power to hale into court those present within its
boundaries. 495 U.S. at 610-19, 110 S. Ct. at 2110-15. The roots of this method of asserting
personal jurisdiction may be traced to Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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corporation's contacts are "continuous and systematic"' will the forum state have
jurisdiction. This Note will examine whether the rationale used by Justice Scalia
in Burnham should be extended to corporations, or whether the concepts of
"minimum contacts" and general jurisdiction were created by the Court to
dispose of (and as a substitute for) the unmanageable test of corporate
"presence."
Part I will journey briefly down the well-travelled road of personal
jurisdiction as applied to corporations. Part II will examine Burnham in an
attempt to understand its reasoning and its potential ramifications on corporate
jurisdictional law. Part III will survey post-Burnham cases that analyze whether
the presence rationale, as espoused by four members of the Court, applies to
corporations. Finally, Part IV will analyze the question posed and conclude that
Burnham and its presence rationale should not be extended to corporations.
I. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
CORPORATIONS
A. Pre-Intemational Shoe
At the time of Pennoyer v. Neff,6 corporations were deemed to be present
at their place of incorporation. Because Pennoyer stood for the principle that a
sovereign state has jurisdiction only over defendants found within its borders, it
necessarily followed that corporations were subject to jurisdiction only where
they were deemed to be "present"-in their place of incorporation.7
Corporations, by virtue of the Commerce Clause, were able to conduct
business outside of their place of incorporation, but according to the strict rule
of Pennoyer, were not subject to suit in those states. Corporations could,
however, bring suit in those states where they conducted business. This was, of
course, an inequitable result to individuals who were harmed by a corporation
outside of its place of incorporation.
Some courts reacted to this inequity by creating the legal fiction of corporate
"presence"8 in order to subject a corporation to jurisdiction outside of its place
of incorporation. According to this new doctrine, corporations were deemed to
be "present" if they were "doing business"9 within the forum state. This
doctrine proved to be unworkable, however, as courts attempted to sustain
Pennoyer and its sovereignty approach, while applying subjective fairness
5. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S. Ct. 413 (1952).
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
7. Id.
8. Phillip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 582-84 (1958).
9. Id. at 584-86.
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limitations at the same time.'0 This was not intellectually honest, since fairness
limitations were not included in the notion of power that Pennoyer had read into
the Due Process Clause." The legal fiction of corporate "presence" was not the
best mechanism to address whether it was reasonable or fair to hale a defendant
into court. A device was needed which measured the contacts of the defendant
with the forum state, instead of one which pretended to strictly adhere to
Pennoyer and its "power" theory. Recognizing this, International Shoe
developed the "minimum contacts" analysis in place of the "presence" and
"doing business" theories.
B. The International Shoe Era
1. International Shoe
International Shoe Co. v. Washington 2 attempted to do away with the
"nineteenth-century theoretical underbrush"' 3 of the "presence" and "doing
business" notions. In doing so, it departed from the sovereignty inquiry of
10. See In re DES, 789 F. Supp. 552, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,
Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand. J.).
11. In re DES, 789 F. Supp. at 582. Judge Learned Hand had this to say regarding the
inadequacies of the corporate "presence" doctrine:
It scarcely advances the argument to say that a corporation must be "present" in the
foreign state, if we define that word as demanding such dealings as will subject it to
jurisdiction, for then it does no more than put the question to be answered. Indeed, it is
doubtful whether it helps much in any event. It is difficult, to us it seems impossible, to
impute the idea of locality to a corporation, except by virtue of those acts which realize
its purposes....
When we say therefore, that a corporation may be sued only where it is "present," we
understand that the word is used, not literally, but as shorthand for something else. It
might indeed be argued that it must stand suit upon any controversy arising out of legal
transactions entered into where the suit was brought, but that would impose upon it too
severe a burden. On the other hand, it is not plain that it ought not, upon proper notice,
to defend suits arising out of foreign transactions, if it conducts a continuous business in
the state of the forum .... There must be some continuous dealings in the state of the
forum; enough to demand trial away from its home.
This last appears to us to be really the controlling consideration, expressed shortly by
the word "presence," but involving an estimate of the inconveniences which would result
from requiring it to defend, where it has been sued. We are to inquire whether the extent
and continuity of what it has done in the state in question makes it reasonable to bring
it before one of its courts. Nor is it anomalous to make the question of jurisdiction
depend upon a practical test.... This does not indeed avoid the uncertainties, for it is
as hard to judge what dealings make it just to subject a foreign corporation to local suit,
as to say when it is "present," but at least it puts the real question, and that is something.
Hutchinson, 45 F.2d at 141.
12. 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945).
13. In re DES, 789 F. Supp. at 582.
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Pennoyer in favor of a more flexible "fairness" approach. Under this analysis,
a new touchstone of jurisdictional law emerged:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."' 4
Although the "fairness" approach represented a tremendous change in many
respects, the test retained a sovereignty component in that an individual
defendant is subject to in personam jurisdiction if present within the forum state.
Thus, it may be fairly argued that "minimum contacts" are only required when
dealing with an absent defendant; a defendant served with process while present
in the forum state would automatically be subject to jurisdiction without regard
for any "fairness" inquiry. This argument is further supported by the precise
holding of International Shoe, which involved a corporate defendant that was
"absent" from the forum state under the old "doing business" test. 5
In Burnham, Justice Scalia applied this sovereignty component in determin-
ing that International Shoe did not overrule the "presence" basis of jurisdiction
as to individuals present within the state.' 6 Although this line of reasoning is
probably consistent with International Shoe, it would be fallacious to apply this
same reasoning to jurisdiction over corporations. The test announced in
International Shoe attempted to do away with the fiction of corporate presence
by substituting a "minimum contacts" analysis in its place."
This argument is also supported by the explanation given by the Court in
International Shoe of why it was undertaking a "minimum contacts" analysis
instead of a "presence" analysis:
[I]t is clear that unlike an individual [a corporation's] "presence"
without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only
14. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 158 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 343 (1940)) (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 313-14, 66 S. Ct. at 157. As used in this Note, a "present" individual refers to one
who is served with process while in the forum state; an "absent" person is one who is not served with
process while in the forum state. A "present" corporate defendant is one that is incorporated in or
whose principal place of business is in the forum state. An "absent" corporate defendant means a
corporation that is not incorporated in and does not have its principal place of business in the forum
state. As applied to corporations, of course, these shorthand meanings do not resolve the issue of
whether a corporation is "present" by virtue of its "minimum contacts" with the forum state or
because some other basis of in personam jurisdiction exists.
16. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
17. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction. 101 Harv. L. Rev. 610. 624 n.66
(1988) ("[T]he Supreme Court in International Shoe discarded the 'presence' test as applied to
nonresident corporations..."); Eliot D. Prescott, Note, Transient Jurisdiction ts Here To Stay:
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 1125. 1151 n. 179 (1991) (suggesting that
general jurisdiction is based on the "presence" theory).
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by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act
for it. To say that the corporation is so far "present" there ... is to beg
the question to be decided. For the terms "present" or "presence" are
used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent
within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process. 8
Indeed, unlike the physical nature of an individual that survives even his death,
corporate entities exist only to the extent of their contacts with the outside world.
2. General and Specific Jurisdiction
The doctrines of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction have emerged
from this new "minimum contacts" inquiry. As the Court stated in Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,9 "When a State exercises personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or relating to the
defendant's contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be exercising
general jurisdiction over the defendant." General jurisdiction is conferred upon
a court only if the defendant's contacts with the forum state are "continuous and
systematic."20 If general jurisdiction exists, the corporation could be compelled
to defend any suit brought against it within that state.
For example, corporation X enters into a contract with Y in state A.
Corporation X also conducts certain activities in state B. If these activities meet
the threshold of "continuous and systematic," corporation X would be amenable
to a suit brought by Y in state B for a breach of contract which occurred in state
A. Thus it may be said that state B's jurisdiction over corporation X is "dispute-
blind," as the court is not concerned about the type of action being litigated; only
the nature of the defendant's contacts with the forum state are analyzed. 2'
The theory of general jurisdiction, like the threshold "minimum contacts"
analysis which it grew out of, saw its beginnings in the old "presence" and
18. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 158 (citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,
Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.)).
19. 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872 n.9 (1984).
20. See Twitchell, supra note 17; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15,
105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 n.15 (1985); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16, 104 S. Ct. at 1872-73; Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438, 72 S. Ct. 413,414-15 (1952); International Shoe,
326 U.S. at 317, 66 S. Ct. at 159; Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir.
1930).
21. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 627, 636 ("[Under a dispute-blind test the nature of the
defendant's forum contacts should be the sole factor in determining the presence or absence of
general jurisdiction ...."). In Burnham, Justice Scalia suggests that general jurisdiction applies only
to corpovations: "It may be that whatever special rule exists permitting 'continuous and systematic'
contacts to support jurisdiction with respect to matters unrelated to activity in the forum, applies oly




"doing business" doctrines.22 Thus, courts still use the old terminology of
"presence" and "doing business" when determining if there is general jurisdiction
over a defendant-corporation.23 Because of this use of language, a defendant
which has a tangible physical "presence," such as a small office within the
forum, is more likely to be subject to general jurisdiction than a defendant with
more extensive contacts with the forum, but no physical "presence. 24 This
does not mean, however, that the "presence" doctrine is still alive; rather, it
indicates that the new test is still grappling with essentially the same problem as
Pennoyer. When does a corporation carry on enough activities in a forum state
to justify its being haled into court to defend any suit? As evidenced by the
struggle of courts, the new test carries much of the problematic semantics of the
old one.
Specific jurisdiction is an equally important concept in jurisdictional law.
Unlike its dispute-blind counterpart of general jurisdiction, this type of
jurisdiction requires an analysis into the type of claim involved in the suit. 25
As the Court stated in Helicopteros, "It has been said that when a State exercises
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the
defendant's contacts with the forum, the State is exercising 'specific jurisdiction'
over the defendant."
26
For example, corporation X enters into a contract with Y in state A.
Corporation X's activities in state A fall short of being labeled "continuous and
systematic" contacts; thus, corporation X is not subject to general jurisdiction and
the burden of having to defend any suit that might be brought against it within
the forum. If a breach of contract occurs between corporation X and Y,
however, corporation X may be subject to state A's jurisdiction because the
breach arises out of X's contacts with the state.27 Ultimately, whether or not
state A has jurisdiction depends on whether it is reasonable to hale corporation
X into the state to defend the action. 28 Thus, it may be said that state A's
jurisdiction over corporation X is "dispute-specific."2'9
22. See Kurland, supra note 8, at 582.
23. See Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1992); Bearry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 1987); Demirs v. Plexicraft, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 250,
254 (D.R.I. 1991).
24. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 634.
25. Id. at 644.
26. 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872 n.8 (1984).
27. It may be that more contacts are needed than simply entering into a contract within the
forum. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
28. To determine the "reasonableness" of haling a defendant into court to defend a claim, the
court must look to the contacts to see if the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits
of a state so that he could reasonably anticipate being sued there. See id. at 472, 105 S. Ct. at 2182;
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp, v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980): Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235. 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1240 (1958); see also Twitchell, supra note 17, at
645 n.160.
29. The rules of specific jurisdiction as applied to individuals and corporations are not affected
by Burnham because a nonresident defendant may still be sued when a claim arises out of its contacts
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II. BURNHAM V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
A. Facts of the Case
Mr. and Mrs. Dennis Burnham were living in New Jersey when they decided
to separate in July 1987. Both parties agreed that Mrs. Burnham, who intended
to move to California, would take custody of their two children. They also
agreed that Mrs. Burnham would file for divorce on grounds of "irreconcilable
differences."'
In October 1987, Mr. Burnham deviated from this agreement by filing for
divorce in New Jersey state court.on grounds of desertion. Mrs. Burnham was
never issued a summons, however, nor was she served with process. In January
1988, after unsuccessfully attempting to persuade Mr. Burnham to adhere to their
previous agreement, Mrs. Burnham sued him for divorce in California state
court.3 '
Later that same month, Mr. Burnham visited California for the joint purposes
of visiting his children and conducting business. After taking care of his
business affairs, Mr. Burnham took his oldest child to San Francisco for the
weekend. Upon his return of the child to Mrs. Burnham's residence, he was
promptly served with a California court summons and a copy of Mrs. Burnham's
divorce petition. 2
B. Opinion of the Court
The question presented to the Court was whether the California court could
exercise personal jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham. In a unanimous affirmative
response to the question, the Court battled fiercely over which line of reasoning
correctly supported the answer. While all nine Justices agreed in the outcome,
there was a 4-4-1 split in the rationale justifying California's exercise of
jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham.
Justice Scalia (joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
White, in part) reasoned that the physical presence of an individual in the forum
state accompanied by service confers jurisdiction.33 The support for this
reasoning was that presence is a traditional basis for a state's exercise of in
personam jurisdiction, and thus comports with due process. 4 Justice White did
not join one section of Scalia's opinion because he would permit the Court to
invalidate "even traditionally accepted procedures" if they denied due process. 5
with the forum state.
30. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 638, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (1990).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 619, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
34. Id. at 610, 110 S. Ct. at 2110.
35. Id. at 628, 110 S. Ct. at 2119 (White, J., concurring). Justice White joined Justice Scalia's
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He refused, however, to characterize transient jurisdiction as one of those
"procedures" that "is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many
instances that it should be held violative of due process. '
Justice Brennan wrote a concurrence (joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and O'Connor) rejecting presence as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over the
individual."? Instead, he would use presence as a factor to be considered in the
"minimum contacts" analysis,38 as set forth by International Shoe.39
Justice Stevens agreed with the outcome, but gave no specific reasons why
jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham could be conferred on the California court.
Instead, he chastised the other members of the Court for what he perceived to
be too much analysis of the case, suggesting that "the adage about hard cases
making bad law should be revised to cover easy cases.""0
In his reasoning that transient jurisdiction4' is not violative of due process,
Justice Scalia based his argument on the history of jurisdictional law. Indeed,
Scalia wrote that "[almong the most firmly established principles of personal
jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction
over nonresidents who are physically present in the State. 42 He supported his
argument by pointing to Justice Story,43 whose beliefs regarding transient
jurisdiction were incorporated in the Pennoyer v. Neff decision." Story
believed the principle of transient jurisdiction, "which he traced to Roman
origins, to be firmly grounded in English tradition." 5 Scalia added that based
on "contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous decisions, one must conclude that
Story's understanding was shared by American courts at the crucial time for
present purposes: 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. '" 6
opinion insofar as it held that transient jurisdiction does not violate due process. In White's view,
transient jurisdiction "is so widely accepted throughout this country that" he "could not possibly
strike it down ... on the ground that it denies due process of law .... " Id. He disagreed, however,
with Scalia's absolute reliance on historical pedigree: "[T]he Court has the authority ... to examine
even traditionally accepted procedures and declare them invalid." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 628, 110 S, Ct. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
38. Id.
39. 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945).
40. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 640. 110 S. Ct. at 2126 (Stevens, J.. concurring).
41. The term "transient jurisdiction" refers "to jurisdiction premised solely on the fact that a
person is served with process while physically present in the forum State." Id. at 629 n.i, 110 S. Ct.
at 2120 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
42. /d. at 610, 110 S. Ct. at 2110.
43. Id. at 611, 110 S. Ct. at 2111.
44. 95 U.S 714 (1878). See Paul C. Wilson, Note, A Pedigree for Due Process?, 56 Mo. L.
Rev. 353, 368 (1991).
45. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604,611, I10 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (citing
J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws §§ 530-538, 543, 554 (1846) ("'B[yl the common
law[,] personal actions, being transitory, may be brought in any place, where the party defendant may
be found,' for 'every nation may . . . rightfully exercise jurisdiction over all persons within its
domains.')).
46. Id. at 611, 1 llS. Ct. at 2111 (citing Murphy v. J.S. Winter & Co.. 18 Ga. 690 (1855)).
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The effect of this history, in Scalia's view, is that presence as a basis for in
personam jurisdiction is not violative of due process. Justice Scalia followed the
view of the Supreme Court's decision in Hurtado v. California:
[A] process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken
to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage
both in England and in this country .... [That which], in substance,
has been immemorially the actual law of the land ... therefor[e] is due
process of law.47
Furthermore, Justice Scalia denied that International Shoe and its progeny
foreclosed his reliance on historical pedigree. He argued that because
International Shoe involved jurisdiction over an absent defendant, it does not
require a "minimum contacts" analysis over a physically present defendant.4 9
In other words, the test set out in International Shoe to determine whether
jurisdiction is consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" should be applied only in cases involving absent defendants,
Therefore, International Shoe does not overrule one of the bases of jurisdiction
recognized in Pennoyer v. Neff 51 (as well as Justice Story's belief): the
physical presence of an individual within the forum state is a basis for
jurisdiction. Scalia concluded this line of reasoning by writing:
The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical
presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continu-
ing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard
of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." That
standard was developed by analogy to "physical presence," and it would
be perverse to say it could now be turned against that touchstone of
jurisdiction.52
Scalia left open the question of whether this rationale for presence as a basis
for jurisdiction should apply to corporations. The only mention of corporations
appeared in a footnote of his opinion:
We have said that "[elven when the cause of action does not arise
out of or relate to the foreign corporation's activities in the forum State,
due process is not offended by a State's subjecting the corporation to
its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between
47. Id. at 619, 110 S. Ct. at 2115 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29, 4 S.
Ct. 111, 117-118 (1884)).
48. Id. at 619, 110 S. Ct. at 2115; see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66
S. Ct. 154 (1945).
49. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 618, 110 S. Ct. at 2114.
50. Id.
51. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
52. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
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the State and the foreign corporation." Our only holding supporting that
statement, however, involved "regular service of summons upon [the
corporation's] president while he was in [the forum State] acting in that
capacity." It may be that whatever special rule exists permitting
"continuous and systematic" contacts, to support jurisdiction with
respect to matters unrelated to activity in the forum, applies only to
corporations, which have never fitted comfortably in a jurisdictional
regime based primarily upon "de facto power over the defendant's
person." We express no views on these matters .... 53
The language of this footnote is open to varying interpretations, as may be seen
by a survey of the cases following Burnham.-
Justice Brennan (joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor)
concurred in the judgment of the Court that Mr. Burnham was subject to the
jurisdiction of California. While agreeing that transient jurisdiction does not
usually violate due process, Brennan opined that a rule which is part of this
country's tradition does not necessarily comply with due process "by virtue of
its 'pedigree."' 55 Because of his belief that history is not the only factor which
makes a traditional rule constitutional, Brennan would have made an independent
inquiry to determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction was consistent with
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. '"56
In support of his argument that history is not dispositive of the jurisdictional
issue, Brennan cited the innovative Shaffer v. Heitner decision." In Shaffer, the
Supreme Court supposedly broke with the traditional rules regarding quasi in rem
jurisdiction to comport with contemporary notions of due process.5"
Although Justice Brennan did not use presence as the sole factor for
conferring jurisdiction over the defendant, he used it as a weighty factor in
determining whether the "minimum contacts" analysis was satisfied. Because
American courts have upheld transient jurisdiction for over a century, Brennan
stated that it "is consistent with reasonable expectations and is entitled to a
strong presumption that it comports with due process." 59 He stated further that
"by visiting the forum State, a transient defendant actually 'avail[s]' himself of
53. Id. at 610 n.l1 110 S. Ct. at 2110 n.I (citations omitted).
54. See infra Part Ill.
55. Id. at 629, 110 S. Ct. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 629-30, 110 S. Ct. at 2120-21. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339,
343 (1940)).
57. Burniham, 495 U.S. at 633, 110 S. Ct. at 2122.
58. Id. at 630, 110 S. Ct. at 2120 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569
(1977), where quasi in rem jurisdiction, although it had been the law for over 100 years, was
overruled because it did not comport with contemporary notions of due process).
59. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 637, 110 S. Ct. at 2124.
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significant benefits provided by the State,"60 and thus comports with the
requirements of due process.
In Burnham, Justice Scalia simply reaffirmed what Pennoyer v. Neff held
over 100 years ago-that a state has jurisdiction over an individual who is
present within its borders. 6' This does not depart, however, from the "mini-
mum contacts" test of International Shoe; rather, it merely limits its application
to absent defendants. Although Justice Brennan would conduct a "fairness"
inquiry into all jurisdictional issues, whether it concerns an absent or present
defendant, International Shoe does not on its facts extend to present defendants.
With this in mind, the focus of this Note shifts to the issue of whether other
courts have extended the "presence" rationale of Burnham to corporations.
III. POST-BURNHAM JURISPRUDENCE
While there is a plethora of cases interpreting whether Justice Scalia's or
Justice Brennan's reasoning will prevail in the context of individuals, there are
only a handful of cases that tackle the issue of whether "presence" alone is a
constitutionally sufficient basis for jurisdicition over corporations. This section
will examine those cases that have decided the latter question. Significantly, to
maintain that the "presence" rationale does apply to corporations, one must
follow Justice Scalia's argument; if one were to follow Justice Brennan's
argument, then the "fairness" inquiry would be conducted in all instances,
thereby defeating the notion that there could be jurisdiction over a corporation
based solely on its "presence."62
A. Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp.63
The plaintiffs in Siemer, all residents of European countries, filed a wrongful
death suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
against a Kansas aircraft manufacturer for a crash that occurred in an Egyptian
desert. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of in
personam jurisdiction." The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Judge Hunter, delivering the opinion of the court, affirmed the district
court's decision.6
The defendant was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Kansas. Its contacts with Texas consisted of a certificate giving it
60. Id., 110 S. Ct. at 2124-25 (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476. 105 S.
Ct. 2174, 2184 (1985)).
61. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
62. Even under Justice Brennan's analysis, the presence of an individual within the forum state
will usually satisfy the "minimum contacts" test.
63. 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992).




the right to do business in Texas; an agent for service of process in Dallas; one
percent of its spare parts sales went to buyers with Texas addresses; a wholly-
owned, but separately operated, subsidary transacted business in San Antonio;
advertisements placed in national journals were distributed in Texas (as well as
other states); and the defendant mailed information to prospective customers
located in Texas.6
The narrow issue of the case was whether in-state service of process on a
corporate agent, without more, satisfies the requirements of due process.67 The
court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that Burnham was dispositive of the
jurisdictional question, reasoning that Burnham did not involve a corporation and
did not decide any issues pertaining to corporations. 6' Furthermore, the court
stated that "Burnham, to the extent it provides any guidance, ieinforces [the
defendant] Learjet's position."' 9 The court pointed to the first footnote of
Justice Scalia's opinion,70 which noted that "'the continuous and systematic
contact rule [may] appl[y] only to corporations, which have never fitted
comfortably in a jurisdictional regime based primarily upon de facto power over
the defendant's person.".'7
The court then conducted a "minimum contacts" analysis to determine
whether it could assert general jurisdiction over the defendant.72 Finding that
the appointment of an agent for service of process and the registration to do
business within the state, without more, was insufficient to confer general
jurisdiction, the court ruled in favor of the defendant.
B. MBM Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Machine Shop & Shipyard, Inc. 73
In MBM, the president and vice-president of a Louisiana corporation were
representing their company at a Seattle trade show. The Seattle-based plaintiff
attempted to base general jurisdiction on the service of process on these
corporate officers while. present in Washington. The Washington Court of
Appeals granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.74
Similar to Seimer, the Washington Court of Appeals found that Burnham did
not decide the issue of whether corporate "presence" is a constitutionally
sufficient basis for in personam jurisdiction. The court stated in a footnote:
66. Id. at 181.
67. Id. at 180.
68. Id. at 182.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
71. Siemer v. Leajet Acquisition Corp.. 966 F.2d 179, 182-83 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Burnham
v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 610, 110 S. Ct. 2105. 2110 n.I (1990)).
72. Id. at 183.
73. 804 P.2d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
74. Id. at 629-31.
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[T]he nonresident defendant in Burnham was a natural person. Whether
or not a nonresident natural person may be subject to the jurisdiction of
this state by virtue of his or her mere presence in Washington, an issue
we do not here decide, service of process on an agent of a nonresident
corporation who is merely "present" in Washington does not, without
more, comport with due process."
Thus, the court rejected the notion that the transient "presence" of an
unregistered corporate agent is enough to confer jurisdiction over a corporation.
However, the court did not decide the issue of whether the "presence" of a
registered agent is a sufficient'basis for personal jurisdiction. It did decide that,
under the "fairness" approach, the defendant did not engage in such "continuous
or substantial activity" as would permit Washington to exercise general
jurisdiction.7 6
C. Demirs v. Plexicraft, Inc."
The plaintiff in Demirs, a resident of Rhode Island, sued the defendant, a
California corporation, for breach of an employment contract. The federal
district court of Rhode Island framed the issue in a specific jurisdiction context,
finding that the cause of action arose "from a breach of an employment contract
with a Rhode Island resident and the defendant's contacts with Rhode Island
arise from that contract."78 Determining that it could exercise specific jurisdic-
tion because the defendant had "minimum contacts" with the forum "such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice,"' the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.79
The court buttressed its minimum contacts analysis with the argument that
the "presence" of the corporation was a major factor to be considered:
This Court notes that although "minimum contacts" has become the
touchstone of in personam jurisdiction, presence of a defendant in the
jurisdiction is still to be considered. To the extent that the corporate
defendant paid rent and thereby leased office space from the plaintiff,
I find that the defendant established a physical presence within Rhode
Island which adds support to the already strong case for jurisdiction in
this forum.'
75. Id. at 631 n3.
76. Id. at 631.
77. 754 F. Supp. 250 (D.R.I. 1990).
78. Id. at 252.
79. Id. at 254 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154.
158 (1945)).




More interestingly, in a footnote preceding the above quotation, the court implied
that the "minimum contacts" analysis should be used only for absent defendant
corporations by agreeing with Justice Scalia's analysis of Shaffer and Internation-
al Shoe: "Shaffer, like International Shoe, involved jurisdiction over an absent
defendant, and it stands for nothing more than the proposition that when the
'minimum contact' that is a substitute for physical presence consists of property
ownership it must, like other minimum contacts, be related to the litigation."8"
Although the court used a "minimum contacts" analysis to assert jurisdiction
over the defendant, it is unclear whether it would have found "presence" alone
a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction. Judging by the court's placing of the
above footnote within the context of its discussion of "presence," however, it is
conceivable that jurisdiction could have been based on the corporation's
"physical presence" alone. 2
D. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Purex Industries, Inc.
8 3
The plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation, served process on the registered
agent of a nonresident corporation. The Superior Court of New Jersey held that
Scalia's rationale in Burnham applied to corporations. Implicit in this holding
is that no "minimum contacts" analysis is required when there is a "present"
corporate defendant. Therefore, the court eschewed a "minimum contacts"
analysis, and held that jurisdiction existed over the defendant corporation, which
was deemed to be "present" because.it had an agent who was registered for
service of process with the Secretary of State.
To support its holding, the court wrote that "[w]hile due process merely
requires that a nonresident defendant 'reasonably anticipate' being sued in the
forum state, presence of an individual defendant in the forum state accompanied
by service, confers in personam jurisdiction."" Additionally, the court stated
that "[olnly where there was no service on a corporate registered agent has
question been raised involving service upon unregistered agents as the corporate
'presence' in the state."85 In essence, the court argued that when a registered
agent of a corporation has been served with process, the United States Supreme
Court has never questioned jurisdiction over that defendant. Rather, the only
time "presence" as a basis for jurisdiction over corporations has been questioned
was when service was made on an unregistered agent. 86 The question remains,
however, whether the presence of an unregistered agent constitutes corporate
"presence."
81. Id. at 254 n.1 (citing Burnham, 495 U.S. at 620, 110 S.Ct. at 2115) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 254.
83. 576 A.2d 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
84. Id. at 944 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100
S."tt. 559, 567 (1980)) (emphasis added).
85. Allied-Signal, 576 A.2d at 945.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 101-108.
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In contrast to the Siemer court's interpretation of Justice Scalia's footnote
in Burnham, 7 the Allied-Signal court stated that, "Justice Scalia was not ...
referring to circumstances limiting state jurisdiction, but to circumstances
expanding state jurisdiction and possibly [circumstances] unique to corporations,
which obviously have no personal presence anywhere."8 8 The Allied-Signal
court suggested that Justice Scalia meant that general jurisdiction only applies to
corporations-not individuals. Furthermore, the court refused to limit Burnham
to its facts; instead, it used the footnote to extend Scalia's rationale to apply to
corporate defendants that have a registered agent in the forum state.
IV. ANALYSIS
Four members of the Supreme Court in Burnham argued that the mere
presence of an individual in the forum is a sufficient basis for a state's exercise
of personal jurisdiction. 89 Whether courts will extend this argument to assert
jurisdiction over corporations based on their "presence," without applying a
subjective "fairness" test, is unclear. However, courts should not engage in a
"presence" analysis with respect to corporations, as the concepts of "minimum
contacts" and general jurisdiction were created to dispose of this unworkable test.
A. Text of International Shoe
In support of the proposition that "presence" is something different from
general jurisdiction and thus a viable alternative basis for jurisdiction over
corporations, a strong argument can be based on the text of International Shoe.
The Court stated that if the defendant is "not present within the territory of the
forum," then a "minimum contacts" analysis should be applied. 9° It necessarily
follows that if the defendant is present within the forum when served with
process, then no "minimum contacts" analysis is required. However, Internation-
al Shoe involved an absent defendant, so its jurisprudential value regarding
present defendants is questionable, as Justice Scalia recognized in Burnham.91
To maintain that International Shoe does not abrogate presence as a basis
for jurisdiction over corporations, one must ignore that the "minimum contacts"
test in International Shoe was meant to cure the previous difficulties associated
with the "presence" analysis.92 As the Court stated in International Shoe, "To
say that the corporation is . . . 'present' . . . is to beg the question to be decided.
87. See supra text accompanying note 53.
88. Id. at 944-45.
89. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
90. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945).
91. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
92. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 624 n.66; Prescott, supra note 17. at 1151.
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For the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those
activities of the corporation's agent within the state ....- 9'
B. "Pedigree" Supporting "Presence" as a Constitutionally Sufficient Basis
for Jurisdiction
One may also argue that the history of personal jurisdiction supports the
argument that "presence" is still a constitutionally sufficient basis for asserting
jurisdiction over corporations. As Justice Scalia noted in Burnham, jurisdiction
over individuals based on "presence" is one of the continuing traditions of our
legal system that defines due process. Corporations, by analogy, have
traditionally been subject to jurisdiction wherever they are "present." "Minimum
contacts," and its general jurisdictional component, was developed as a substitute
for the "presence" doctrine. According to this argument, because the "minimum
contacts" doctrine is a substitute for the old test of "presence," it follows that the
"minimum contacts" should not now be turned against the "presence" touchstone
of jurisdiction. Thus, the argument concludes, jurisdiction may still be conferred
over a corporation based on "presence.""
If "minimum contacts" do not make the "presence" analysis obsolete, the
next logical question is what utility the "presence" doctrine would serve. Unless
the "presence" test could be used to assert jurisdiction even where a general
jurisdictional framework would not confer jurisdiction upon a court, the
"presence" argument, as applied to corporations, serves no useful purpose today.
In Burnham, Justice Scalia applied the "presence" test to an individual. This
was easily done because Mr. Burnham could be found within the state. More
importantly, Justice Scalia undoubtedly thought that there was a need for the
Court to establish a "presence" test for individuals. It may be that an individual
is present in the forum when served with process even though his contacts with
the state fall short of being deemed "continuous and systematic." 95 Further-
more, the claim against the individual may neither arise out of nor relate to the
defendant's contacts with the forum state.9 In this scenario, both general and
specific jurisdictional frameworks would fail to grant jurisdiction. 9 Thus, a
93. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 159 (citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,
Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.)).
94. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
95. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438, 72 S. Ct. 413, 414 (1952).
96. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 1868,
1872 n.8 (1984).
97. Arguably, general jurisdiction never applies to individuals, but only to corporations, as
Justice Scalia suggests in a footnote in Burnham: "It may be that whatever special rule exists
permitting 'continuous and systematic' contacts, to support jurisdiction with respect to matters
unrelated to activity in the forum, applies only to corporations ... 495 U.S. 604, 610 n.I. 110
S. Ct. 2105, 2110 n.I (1990) (citation omitted).
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"presence" test allows courts to assert jurisdiction over a transient defendant if
he is physically present and served within the borders of the forum.98
1. Transient "Presence" of Corporations
With corporations, no such need to implement a separate "presence" test
exists. Although there are at least two arguments to the contrary, the "gap" that
was evident in the context of individuals is not apparent with corporations. First,
it can be argued that a corporation should be deemed "present" when any of its
agents are within the forum, no matter how fleeting the agent's appearance may
be. However, this argument is easily disposed of, as the MBM Fisheries" case
illustrates. Courts long ago dismissed the notion that jurisdiction could be
conferred over a corporation based on its transient "presence."'00
2. "Single-Contact" Basis of Jurisdiction
A more persuasive argument may be that the registration of an agent to
receive process in a state is automatically sufficient to support jurisdiction over
a corporation. Like transient jurisdiction over individuals, there is a "gap"
between the general and specific jurisdictional frameworks where the corporation
would not be subject to jurisdiction, since its contacts may neither be "continuous
and systematic," nor its specific contacts sufficiently related to the suit at hand.
In this case, a "presence" analysis would support jurisdiction if the agent's
"physical presence" is equated with the corporation's "presence." Some
authority supporting this basis for jurisdiction exists, including Allied-Signal, that
held when a corporation has registered an agent to do business within a state,
then that corporation is deemed to be "present" or "doing business," and has
therefore subjected itself to the jurisdiction of that state. 0
The Allied-Signal court stated that "[o]nly where there was no service on a
corporate registered agent has question been raised involving service upon
unregistered agents as the corporate 'presence' in the state."'0 2 Relying on this
evidence, the court proceeded to consider the "presence" of an agent registered
to receive service of process as a justification for conferring jurisdiction over the
corporation.'0 3
98. The desirability of this result is left open to debate and is beyond the scope of this Note.
99. MBM Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop & Shipyard, Inc., 804 P.2d 627, 631 n.3
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991) ("service of process on an [unregistered] agent of a nonresident corporation
who is merely 'present' in Washington does not, without more, comport with due process.").
100. See Kurland, supra note 8.
101. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Purex Indus., Inc., 576 A.2d 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 634. See also Dombroff v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 450 So. 2d 923 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984).




Although there is some authority for this "single-factor" basis of jurisdic-
tion,' ° ' it is not strongly supported. The Supreme Court has proclaimed that
the "presence" of a registered agent in the forum is a "helpful but not a
conclusive test" in determining if there is jurisdiction over the corporation."
Other courts have stated that a corporation's qualification to do business in the
forum state and service on its registered agent in the state "is of no special
weight" in evaluating general personal jurisdiction.'" Indeed, the Fifth Circuit
came to this same conclusion in Siemer.'
07
Assuming the registration of an agent within the forum state is a constitu-
tionally sufficient ground to support jurisdiction over a corporation, it still does
not follow that a separate "presence" test is the proper analysis. The "single-
factor" jurisdiction may still be better suited to a general jurisdictional framework
which analyzes not only the contacts of the defendant with the forum, but also
the factors under "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"1 08
Thus, when analyzing jurisdiction over corporate defendants, no "gaps" exist for
a "presence" analysis to fill; general jurisdiction is already tailored to factor in
the "presence" of a registered agent.
C. Justice Scalia's Footnote
In a Burnham footnote, Justice Scalia touches upon the question of whether
"presence" is a constitutionally valid basis for jurisdiction over a corporation.'09
Although the last sentence of this footnote seemingly indicates that Justice Scalia
remains neutral on the issue, since the Court in Burnham expressed "no views
104. See David H. Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on
the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 Wash. U. L.Q. 273 (1978).
105. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445, 72 S. Ct. 413, 418 (1952).
106. Ratliff v. Cooper Lab., Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971).
107. Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992).
108. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945); Ratliff,
444 F.2d at 748; Siemer, 966 F.2d 179.
109. Justice Scalia's footnote stated:
We have said that "[elven when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the
foreign corporation's activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State's
subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts
between the State and the foreign corporation." Our only holding supporting that
statement, however, involved "regular service of summons upon [the corporation's]
president while he was in [the forum State] acting in that capacity." It may be that
whatever special rule exists permitting "continuous and systematic" contacts to support
jurisdiction with respect to matters unrelated to activity in the forum applies only to
corporations, which have never fitted comfortably in a jurisdictional regime based upon
"de facto power over the defendant's person." We express no views on these mat-
ters ....




on [the] matte[r],""10 the Siemer and Allied-Signal courts quoted his language
in support of contradictory interpretations."'
The Siemer court has given the proper interpretation to Justice Scalia's
footnote. The only guidance the footnote provides is in line with historical
lessons-the application of a "presence" theory to corporations is unworkable.
Allied-Signal mistakenly reads the footnote to mean that Scalia intended to
expand jurisdiction over corporations, presumably making both general
jurisdiction and "presence" available as bases for jurisdiction over corporations.
Although Scalia suggests that general jurisdiction applies only to corpora-
tions," 2 it does not follow that corporations are subject to the "presence"
theory that applies to individuals. Quite the opposite follows, since general
jurisdiction was developed after International Shoe as a substitute for the
"presence" doctrine."' Indeed, general jurisdiction over corporations is the
corollary to "presence" as a basis for jurisdiction over individuals. Therefore,
Burnham should not be applied to corporations.
D. Policy Considerations
Besides textual and historical arguments, policy considerations also weigh
against acceptance of "presence" as a constitutionally viable basis for jurisdiction
over corporations. Two significant policy concerns, the danger of unlimited
jurisdiction and the threat of forum-shopping, discourage the application of any
corporate presence theory. Suppose that the "single contact" basis of jurisdiction
.is upheld as an instance where a "presence" analysis would operate. Under this
scenario, a giant corporation such as Exxon would be subject to jurisdiction in
virtually every state based on its "presence." Once the court found that Exxon
had one contact-a registered agent-with the forum, the court could deem
Exxon "present" for juridictional purposes, regardless of its level of contacts with
the forum state and without engaging in any "fairness" debate. In this case, it
would not matter if it were unfair for Exxon to defend every type of claim in
every state. All that would matter would be whether Exxon had a registered
agent in the forum.
Although one may quickly conclude that no injustice has occurred because
Exxon receives benefits from every state and has considerable resources to
defend such suits, this quick reaction changes when examining other situations.
For instance, suppose a small mail-order business in Michigan derives a very
small profit from customers in Georgia. To do business in the state, Georgia
requires the corporation to register an agent for service of process. According
110. Id.
111. See supra discussion at notes 63-72, 83-88 and accompanying text.
112. See Daniel J. Capra, Discretion Must Be Controlled, Judicial Authority Circumscribed,
Federalism Preserved, Plain Meaning Enforced, and Everything Must Be Simplified: Recent Supreme
Court Contributions to Federal Civil Practice, 50 Md. L. Rev. 632, 671 (1991).
113. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 634.
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to the "presence" analysis, the Michigan corporation may be haled into the
Georgia court to defend any suit filed against it.
Additionally, if a "single contact" basis of jurisdiction is adopted, nothing
prevents plaintiffs from forum shopping for the most favorable law against large
corporations, such as Exxon, and small corporations, such as the Michigan mail
order business. To sue Exxon for a negligence claim, plaintiff could easily
search the statutes of every state to find the longest prescriptive period and the
highest damage cap. To control such manipulation of the law, courts should not
apply the "presence" test to corporations.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note does not attempt to resolve the difficult question of what
constitutes corporate "presence" because "presence" should not be a basis for
jurisdiction over corporations. It can not be said with any degree of certainty
when and where a corporation, because of its incorporeal nature, is "present."
Is a corporation "present" when there are no offices in the state, but all of its
employees reside within the forum? Is a corporation "present" when all of its
offices are in the state, but none of its employees reside in the forum? Is a
corporation "present" when half of its offices and employees reside within the
forum while the other half of its offices and employees are in another state? Is
the corporation "present" in both states? It quickly becomes apparent why there
should not be a strict "presence" test for corporations, but a more manageable
"fairness" analysis.
In the aftermath of Burnham, it would be incorrect to implement a
"presence" analysis from both a theoretical and practical standpoint. Internation-
al Shoe disposed of the "presence" test in favor of the "minimum contacts"
analysis, and the abstract concept of corporate "presence" has proven difficult to
manage. Therefore, Justice Scalia's rationale in Burnham should not be extended
to establish "presence" as a constitutionally sufficient alternative basis of jurisdic-
tion.
Steven Mathew Wald
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